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1. Introduction
A separation of ownership and control gives rise to agency problems and results in 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Shareholders demand 
conservative accounting to mitigate the effects of information asymmetry (LaFond 
and Watts, 2008). Accounting conservatism, defined as financial reporting policies or 
tendencies that results in the downward bias of accounting net asset value relative to 
economic net asset value (Ruch and Taloy, 2015), is a potential mechanism to address 
the agency problem (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008; 
García Lara et al., 2016). This is because accounting itself has a primary function to 
provide information that allows contracting parties to evaluate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of performed obligations in contracting settings. Accounting 
conservatism alleviates information asymmetry and improves information quality 
(Kim et al., 2013).
Corporate governance is a mechanism that shareholders use to monitor firm 
executives in order to minimize agency costs (Caskey and Laux, 2017). One primary 
way of monitoring firm executives is to align executive incentives with shareholder 
values by offering executive compensation contracts including stock options (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990; Mohan and Ainina, 2012; Bennett et al., 2017). The novel 
intention of such contracts is to motivate executives to work hard and to restrict their 
opportunism (Raffi et al., 2014). The relationship between executive remuneration 
and corporate governance has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Core et al., 
1999; Firth et al., 2007; Baixauli-Soler and Sanchez-Marin, 2015; Deschenes et al., 
2015; Ntim et al., 2017). 
Accounting performance has been used as the main yardstick for executive 
compensation contracts in many countries. Prior studies have recognized that while 
accounting performance reflects the state of a firm’s operations, it also gives 
executives incentive to overstate the firm’s net asset value and earnings with a view to 
maximizing their personal welfares (Sun, 2014). However, the loss of investor 
confidence in the integrity of the accounting profession following several major 
financial reporting scandals has resulted in a growing concern in the literature about 
the quality of accounting measure used for executive compensating contracts 
(AL-Dhamari and Ismail, 2014; Li and Wang, 2016).
Conservatism results in an understatement of accounting value and performance 
relative to the market value due to an understatement of assets and revenues and/or an 
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overstatement of liabilities and expenses (Zhong and Li, 2016). The literature has 
generally shown that accounting performance information under the conservatism 
principle reflects the value of assets more creditable (Iatridis, 2011). Also, 
conservatism reduces the room of earnings manipulation and signals the potential 
self-interest behavior of executives timelier (Bertomeu et al., 2017). Overall, it has 
been argued that conservatism could improve the effectiveness of executive 
compensation contracts.
Various stakeholders of corporate reporting demand conservatism to reduce agency 
costs by mitigating information asymmetry and facilitate corporate governance. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance quality 
and accounting conservatism, portraying a positive relation between the two (e.g., 
Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012; García Lara et al., 2009). It has been argued that 
conservatism as a tool that a board of directors can use to monitor and control 
managers’ investment decisions (Ball, 2001), therefore to improve a firm’s investment 
efficiencies (Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; García Lara et al., 2016) and reduce 
investment risk (Kim and Zhang, 2016). 
There is considerable debate on whether executive compensation contracts are 
designed to align executive incentives with shareholder values. Several studies attempt 
to use executive compensation-performance sensitivity as a magnitude of the 
alignment of shareholders’ interests with those of executive management (e.g., Lippert 
and Porter, 1997; Iyengar and Zampelli, 2010). Executive compensation-performance 
sensitivity is commonly defined as the change in executives’ compensation that is 
associated with a given performance of an organization that they manage (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990), reflecting the absolute increment to the executives’ compensation 
associated with a given amount of firm performance increased. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) argue that higher the sensitivity, as indicating a closer alignment of interests 
between executives and shareholders, the more efficient the compensation contract is. 
Earlier studies have established the relationship of executive 
compensation-performance sensitivity with firm risk (Core and Guay, 2002; Dai et al., 
2014), risk-taking behavior (Yang and Hou, 2016; Steinbach et al., 2017) and 
corporate governance (Lippert and Porter, 1997; Baixauli-Soler and Sanchez-Marin, 
2015; Zhou et al., 2017). The literature has also presented evidence of the influence of 
accounting conservative on firm risk (e.g., Kim and Zhang, 2016), manager risk-taking 
behavior (e.g., Kravet, 2014) and corporate governance (e.g., Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007). Therefore, there are good reasons to expect that accounting conserv tism could 
facilitate the adoption of executive compensation that is sensitive to (accounting) 
performance. However, a very few studies have investigated the impact of accounting 
conservatism on executive compensation-performance sensitivity, which provides a 
research gap for our study.
Our study examines the relationship between accounting conservatism and executive 
compensation-performance sensitivity. With data of 19144 firm-year observations 
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covering a period of 10 year it finds there is a significantly positive relationship 
between accounting conservatism and the executive compensation-performance 
sensitivity of Chinese listed companies, particularly for executive compensation 
contracts where accounting-based performance measure is used. Also, this study finds 
that the impact of conservatism on the executive compensation performance sensitivity 
is more pronounced after the implementation of China’s Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) in 2007. Further, this study reveals that the impact of 
conservatism on the executive compensation performance sensitivity is more 
evidenced when  a firm’s performance is falling, when information asymmetry is 
more serious, when a firm is listed on the main board of China’s stock exchanges, or 
where the degree of marketization is higher.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it provides evidence on the 
positive relationship between accounting conservatism and executive 
compensation-performance sensitivity, which advances our understanding of the 
positive economic outcomes of conservatism (Lafond and Watts, 2008; Kim and 
Pevzner, 2010; Hui et al., 2012; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Second, it adds to our 
understanding of the association between accounting conservatism and corporate 
governance. This study shows that conservatism reduces the agency cost and enhances 
the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts; both are important in assessing 
the benefits of conservatism and informing the debate as to the role of conservatism in 
corporate governance (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; 
Ahmed and Henry, 2012; Ruch and Taylor, 2015; Chen et al., 2017).
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on accounting 
conservatism and executive compensation incentives and develops the hypothesis to be 
tested. The research design and methodology are described in Section 3 “Research 
Design, Data and Descriptive Statistics”. This is followed by a discussion of the results 
in Section 4 “Results”. The final section presents the conclusions.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1 Accounting Conservatism and Its Roles
The most important reason for the existence of conservatism is the contracting 
explanation (Watts, 2003) and its potential benefits. Early in 1997, Basu pointed out 
that by requiring higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to 
recognize bad news as losses, accounting conservatism can mitigate managerial 
opportunistic behavior. Kwon (2005) states that comparing to neutrality and fairness, 
accounting information based on conservatism restrains the cost of managers’ 
next-best policy. Accounting conservatism can improve the persistence of good news 
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2006) and restrain the managerial short-term orientation (Lai 
and Taylor, 2008). Chen et al. (2017) show that accounting conservatism reduces the 
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noise of accounting data and curbs managerial opportunism.
A growing body of literature, as reviewed by Zhong and Li (2016), has examined the 
role of conservatism in alleviating the agency problem between executives and 
shareholders. Watts (2003) shows that accounting conservatism presents excess 
executive compensation by demanding higher verification standards for profits 
relative to losses. Ball (2001) documents that conservatism impedes the capability of 
executives to overstate earnings to shield negative net present value (NPV) projects, 
which subsequently allows shareholders to better recognize negative NPV projects 
and eventually mitigate overinvestment. Francis and Martin (2010) find that 
conservatism plays a role in restraining executives’ investment decisions in negative 
NPV projects because losses from negative NPV projects can be recognized in a 
timelier manner than gains from positive NPV projects, which incentivizes executives 
to choose positive NPV projects. Kravet (2014) shows that accounting conservatism 
constrains executives’ incentive to make risky investment. García Lara et al. (2016) 
document that conservatism mitigates under-investment as it facilitates access to debt 
financing and thus facilitates financing projects. 
Glover and Lin (2016) review the analytical literature on management compensation 
in the context of executive and shareholder relations, suggesting that desirability of 
conservatism depends on particular features of a contracting setting between 
executives and shareholders. Using UK firms’ data from 1984 to 1997, O’Connell 
(2006) finds that changes in earnings impact changes in management compensation 
significantly more in years with positive returns (i.e., good news) than in years with 
negative returns (i.e., bad news), suggesting that there is a relationship between 
accounting conservatives and executives compensation. LaFond and Roychowdhury 
(2008) find that accounting conservatism is negatively associated with managerial 
ownership and the declining managerial ownership increases the severity of agency 
problems between executives and shareholders.
Generally, the relationship between accounting conservatism and executive 
compensation incentives could be explained from at least two aspects. First, 
conservatism protects the shareholders against overcompensating executives as 
accounting conservatism increases the verifiability of reporting information (Watts, 
2003; Hu et al., 2014). Second, as accounting conservatism reduces managerial 
risk-taking (Kravet, 2014; García Lara et al., 2016), compensation incentives based on 
conservatively reported earnings are more likely to induce executives to make better 
business decisions (Francis and Martin, 2010). 
Previous studies have looked into the sensitivity of executive compensation/pay to 
firm performance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lippert and Moore, 1994; Lippert 
and Porter, 1997; Schaefer, 1998; Dai et al., 2014; Yang and Hou, 2016; Zhou et al., 
2017). Lippert and Porter (1997) suggest that the alignment of interests between the 
CEO and shareholders is more important in linking pay to performance sensitivity 
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than CEO influence over the board of directors. Zhou et al. (2017) find the board 
representation of non-controlling shareholders has a positive impact on executive 
pay-for-performance sensitivity, whereas independent directors have a negative 
impact on pay-for-performance sensitivity.
Cordeiro et al. (2013) find that Chinese executives are rewarded more for positive 
accounting performance than they are penalized for negative accounting performance. 
They are also rewarded more for above industry median accounting performance than 
they are penalized for below industry median performance. This disproportionate 
compensation-for-performance sensitivity also holds in a similar way for regional 
benchmarks. They find that the sensitivity between executive compensation and firm 
performance is significantly higher when absolute firm performance was positive, 
when firm performance exceeded the industry or regional average compared to when 
absolute firm performance was negative, or below the industry or regional average. 
Using a large South African dataset, Ntim et al (2017) examine the fundamental 
question of whether CEO power and corporate governance structure can moderate the 
executive compensation-performance sensitivity. Ntim et al. find that CEO power and 
corporate governance structure have a moderating effect on the executive 
compensation-performance sensitivity. They reveal that the sensitivity is higher in 
firms with more reputable, founding and shareholding CEOs, higher ownership by 
directors and institutions, and independent nomination and remuneration committees, 
but lower in firms with larger boards, more powerful and long-tenured CEOs.
A very few studies have attempted to investigate the association between accounting 
conservativism and the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance. Iyengar 
and Zampelli (2010) study the link between conservative accounting practices and the 
sensitivity and find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is 
higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. Unfortunately, their 
study design seriously limits the analysis of their results as they only consider 
discretionary accruals as the proxy for accounting conservatism (Iwasaki et al., 2015). 
In the accounting literature, while discretionary accruals capture the behavior of 
earnings management, the relationship between earnings management and accounting 
conservatism has not yet been fully understood (Penman and Zhang, 2002; Iwasaki et 
al., 2015; García Lara et al., 2017). Iwasaki et al. (2015) examine the relationship 
between accounting conservatism and accounting-based executive compensation 
contracts in Japanese firms and find a positive relationship between accounting 
conservatism and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. They show this positive 
relationship is greater for firms with poor ex-ante information environment. Their 
results imply that the demand for accounting conservatism is higher for firms that use 
more earnings-based executive compensation contracts and have more serious ex post 
settling up problems. However, their model has several limitations that affect the 
answer to the question of relationship between accounting connectivism to executive 
compensation to performance sensitivity. Their model only considers total cash bonus 
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as the proxy for executive compensation. Also, they did not separate executives from 
non-executives in designing their model and measuring compensation.   
2.2 Research Hypotheses
Agency theory explains the problem of modern business structures by identifying the 
conflicts of interests between the agent and principal. For example, often in a business 
the agent takes advantage of the residual right to deprive the interests of the 
shareholders (LaPorta et al., 1999). According to the “shareholder demand” view 
(Cheng et al., 2017), conservatism facilitates efficient contracting between executives 
and shareholders (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003). As the severity of conflicts between 
executives and shareholders increases, shareholders would demand more 
conservatism as a substitute for corporate governance mechanisms to constrain 
executives’ opportunistic behavior (e.g., excess compensation payments and 
inefficient investments). Accordingly, a firm’s level of accounting conservatism is 
expected to relate to executive compensation.
More specifically, information asymmetry emerges once a contract between the 
principal and agent is signed. First, because of high supervision cost, the principal 
cannot directly observe the behaviors of the agent. This results in the moral hazard of 
the agent, which is called hidden action when the principal is not able to observe 
accurately how much effort the agent really puts forth as monitoring is costly and 
precise measures of the agent’s behavior are not available. Second, because of high 
information seeking cost, the agent can get some information that is not observed by 
the principal. This leads to the moral hazard of the principal, which is called hidden 
information. Hidden information refers to the situation where the agent has better 
knowledge about the decision he/she is taking on behalf of the principal. Third, there 
are some uncontrolled shocks that will give executives incentives to pursuit 
self-interest maximization. So, how to design an executive compensation contract 
appears to be especially important. The literature suggests to adopt the form of 
incentive compatibility constraint (Varas, 2017; Xu et al., 2018). To achieve this, the 
contracts are often based on accounting data (Watts and Zimmerman, 1999). The 
common practice is that the executive pay is related to accounting performance 
indicators (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Jenter and Kanaan, 2015; Li and Wang, 2016). 
However, accounting-based performance-related pay and compensation often provide 
the agent with an incentive to use private information to transfer wealth from the 
principal to the agent by accelerating the recognition of economic income or taking 
more aggressive accounting policies. In order to prevent their interests from being 
undermined, the principal needs to set up a more credible performance indictor to 
reveal the manager’s incapable and inaction.
Previous research documents that conservatism can significantly decrease information 
asymmetry, restrain the opportunistic behavior of executives, and reduce transaction 
costs between all stakeholders. Ultimately, it promotes the efficiency of investment 
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(Ahmed and Duellman, 2013; Caskey and Laux, 2017) because of reducing the cost of 
debt and equity financing (Callen et al., 2016) and triggers the enhancement of firm 
value (Goergen and Renneboog, 2011) as conservatism accounting practice adds the 
value of cash holding (Louis et al., 2012). In short, accounting conservatism can help 
to lower shareholders’ information risk, control agency costs, increase shareholders’ 
value. Thereby, it is widely considered an effective governance mechanism (Lafond 
and Watts, 2008; García Lara et al., 2009; Caskey and Laux, 2017; Chen et al., 2017).
In this study, we argue that performance under accounting conservatism could 
mitigate the conflict between shareholders and executives through three potential 
mechanisms. Firstly, conservatism requires higher degree of verifiability for good 
news than bad news (Basu, 1997; Cheng and Lin, 2009). Cheng and Lin (2009) 
document that firms choose not to recognize good news unless it has been supported 
by their superior market performance and industry norm. With this asymmetric 
verifiability requirement, it can reduce managers’ incentives and ability to overstate 
assets and earnings (García Lara et al., 2016). Secondly, because of the limited 
responsibility and restricted tenure, managers would be myopic and they will raise the 
earnings in short term, which can result in negative net cashflows in long term. 
However, the possibilities of earnings manipulation by managers decrease when 
conservative accounting information is adopted (Chen et al., 2007; Hui et al, 2009; 
Kravet, 2014). Thirdly, accounting information that sends out a signal about the risk 
of managers’ behavior much earlier can guide the mangers to give up poor 
performance projects and to stop loss in time (Kim and Zhang, 2016). At large, the 
cornerstone of conservatism is to provide more credible information and reduce the 
noise of accounting performance data. 
Altogether, it can be argued that adopting accounting conservatism, which can help to 
limit earnings management opportunities and improve the reliability of accounting 
performance measure, enables firms to tie executive compensation more closely to 
firm performance.  If shareholders demand conservatism as a contract governance 
device, the degree of conservatism is higher, the sensitivity of executive 
compensation-performance will be higher, implying that accounting conservatism can 
improve the effectiveness of executive contracts. However, there is a possibility that 
the governance effect of executive compensation-performance sensitivity on 
mitigating managerial agency problem might be substituted by accounting 
conservatism. 
According to the optimal contracting theory, a firm’s shareholders design the 
executive compensation contract to maximize firm performance that depends largely 
on the executives’ effort and some random noises (Homström and Milgrom, 1991). 
While firm performance (such as profits) is verifiable and explicitly observable, the 
effort of executives is non-verifiable and difficult to monitor. The first-best contract is 
to compensate the manager based on his effort, which requires the shareholders to 
exert time and effort to monitor the manager and collect such information. When it is 
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costly for the shareholders to do so, explicit (but noisy) performance measures can be 
used to determine the manager's pay (the second-best contract). The first-best contract 
is strictly preferred to the second-best one because the uncertainty caused by the 
random noises is eliminated and the manager can be better incentivized (Gao and Li, 
2015). The theory thus predicts that the use of explicit performance-based contracts is 
less likely when a firm adopts a higher level of accounting conservatism as it can 
significantly decrease information asymmetry and restrain the opportunistic behavior 
of executives. In other words, different levels of accounting conservatism should be 
associated with different extents of executive compensation-performance sensitivity. 
For firms with high (low) accounting conservatism there should be less (more) direct 
monitoring of executives and more (less) reliance on contracts that link executives’ 
compensation to explicit performance measures. 
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize:
H: There is a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and executive 
compensation-performance sensitivity.
3. Research Design, Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Measurement of Accounting Conservatism
This study is based on Watts’ (2003) contracting explanation for conservatism. First, 
we need to use a metric that not only can measure the existence but also the scale of 
conservatism. While a number of models have been developed in the literature as 
shown in Table 1 to capture accounting conservatism, some of them could not apply 
to our study due to their limitations or the unique characteristics of China’s capital 
market. For example, the Basu model, the modified Basu model, the net income 
model, the accruals-cashflow model and the earnings skewness model are not applied 
because these modules only measure the existence of conservatism, not the scale. The 
book-to-market model includes off balance items (such as growth options and 
synergies), which are not available in our dataset. Though the C-score model is indeed 
one of the best firm-year measures of accounting conservatism, it requires stricter 
application conditions including an efficient capital market and an effective law 
enforcement mechanism. The prevailing institutional backgrounds of China’s capital 
market do not satisfy these conditions. The accumulated accruals model provides a 
crude way to measure the levels of accounting conservatism. It contains both 
conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism. Perceiving that accruals are 
expected to be an asymmetric function of firm performance in which economic losses 
are captured by the accruals process in a timelier manner than gains, Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) incorporate conditional conservatism into accruals model.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Following the accrual-based conservatism measure proposed by Ball and Shivakumar 
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(2006), we adopt the following model developed by Iyengar and Zampelli (2010) to 
estimate accounting conservatism, which are given by the residual term ( ).𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 = 𝛼0 1𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉it𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼3 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼4𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                           (1)
Where  is the total accruals of firm i in year t and TA = (net income + 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
depreciation) - cash flows from operation;  is the total assets of firm i at the 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1
end of year t-1; is the revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1;  ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉it 
 is the gross property plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t;  𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
is the cash flow from operations of firm i for period t.  is a dummy variable that 𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
equals one if  is negative, and zero otherwise.  is the residual, which 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡
represents accounting conservatism of firm i in year t. We use  that is equal 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆it
to εit multiplied by (-1) to represent accounting conservatism. The larger the , CONS
the greater the degree of conservatism.
3.2 Measurement of Accounting Performance
Previous research has pointed out that unconditional conservatism may lead to 
earnings management. Based on Chen and Lu (2012), we adopt the true accounting 
performance that is adjusted by discretionary accruals as accounting performance 
(Kothari et al., 2005). Using a performance-matched discretionary accrual measure 
enables researchers to draw more reliable inferences. True accounting performance 
( ) is calculated as:𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 = 𝛼0 1𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉it𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼3 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (2)
Where  is the after-tax net income divided by the total assets of firm i in year t. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
Other variables are as in Eq. (1). Eq. (2) is estimated cross-sectionally for each year 
with the same industry group to obtain the expected residual εit. εit in Eq. (2) 
multiplied by  is equal to the estimated value of discretionary accruals. Then 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1
the true accounting performance ( ) is computed as: 𝑇𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴
                     (3)𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ― 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
3.3 Empirical Model
Firm performance can be assessed by using book-based and market-based measures. 
In this study, both measures are used to test the hypothesis. Adopting the approaches 
of Clarkson et al. (2011) and Huang and Kisgen (2013), we construct the following 
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regression models. 
COMP𝑖 = α0 + α1𝑇𝑅𝑈E_ROA𝑖 + α2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + α3𝑇𝑅𝑈E_ROA𝑖 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖 + ∑
𝑖
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 + ∑
𝑗
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗                 (4)                                                                               COMP𝑖 = α0 + α1𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + α2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + α3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖  + ∑
𝑖
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 +  ∑
𝑗
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗                                                 (5) +                                                                           
∆COMP𝑖 = α0 + α1∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + α2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + α3∆𝑇𝑅𝑈E_ROA𝑖 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖 + ∑
𝑖
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 + ∑
𝑗
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗           (6)                                                                            
∆COMP𝑖 = α0 + α1∆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + α2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + α3∆𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑖 + ∑𝛼𝑖𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖+ ∑
𝑖
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 + ∑
𝑗
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗                                                         (7) +                                                                      
In above models,  and  are dependent variables, which represent for COMP ∆𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃
the level and change value of executive compensation. In China, listed firms disclose 
the sum of total compensation for the top three highest-paid managers.  is stock 𝑅𝐸𝑇
return, which represents for the market-based measure of performance. Models (4) 
and (5) test the effect of conservatism on the correlation of executive 
compensation-performance. Models (6) and (7) test the effect of conservatism on the 
sensitivity of executive compensation-performance. We also include a set of variables 
to control the influence of other factors, such as firm characteristics (including size, 
leverage, ownership, board of directors), region, industry, and year. The 
measurements of these variables are summarized in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 here]
3.4 Data 
It was our intention of using data covering a 10-year period. Our data ended in 2012 
as in 2013 China had major changes in its leadership and economic policies. Mr. Xi 
Jinping became the Country’s President. The nationwide anti-corruption campaign 
began, which had huge influences on the behaviors of senior executives of 
state-owned enterprises. Most state-owned enterprises restrained the scope of 
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executive incentive pays and compensation. Also, in November 2013, China’s 
leadership unveiled a blueprint for some of the most comprehensive economic and 
social reforms in nearly 30 years. To make data comparable and consistent, finally the 
data from 2003 to 2012 were used for our empirical tests.
In this study, the financial and market information was obtained from CSMAR (China 
Stock Market & Accounting Research) database, Wind Info website, and CNINFO 
website. Double-checking among statements published in different sources was 
performed to ensure accuracy. We deleted the firm-year observations that (1) are from 
the financial industries (one-digit Industry Classifying Index Code is “I”); (2) are in 
special treatment (ST) phase (i.e., stocks in danger of being delisted and undergoing 
administrative review over a certain time period. China’s ST system is similar to the 
US Chapter 11 bankruptcy process that filters out inefficient firms and retains the 
efficient firms in operation through reorganization) or particular treatment (PT) phase. 
Under the rules of China’s Securities Regulatory Commission, if a ST firm continues 
to suffer loss for one more year, it will be designated as a PT firm. PT firms’ stocks 
can only be traded on Friday, with a maximum 5% upside limit to last Friday’s close, 
but no restriction on the downside. PT firms will be de-listed if they cannot become 
profitable within one year; (3) have less than 12 months data for computing stock 
returns; (4) miss master variables. Finally, we truncate accounting items needed in the 
calculation of our proxies at the 1st and 99th percentile.
4. Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for COMP (the level of executive 
compensation) and all control variables, while Table 4 presents descriptive statistics 
for accounting conservatism and accounting performance by year. The mean of  CONS
fluctuates during the period of the sample.  and  exhibit 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴
the same trend reflecting that the accounting performance wavelike rises. There are 
three obvious falls in 2005, 2008 and 2012. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]
In our pairwise correlations tests (untabulated), as expected, we find the relationship 
between  and ,  and  are both significantly COMP 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∆COMP ∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴
positive. More importantly,  is negatively associated with , implying that  CONS COMP
conservatism has an inhibitory effect on excessive compensation. We also find the 
relationship between  and  is significantly positive. Consistent CONS 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴
with previous research (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006; Gigler, 2009),  is also CONS
significantly correlated with , , and .SIZE BTM LEV
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4.2 Empirical Results
Table 5 presents the results of regressions that examine the role of accounting 
conservatism on managerial compensation. We first test whether the executive 
compensation contract is effective and the results are reported in Models 1 and 3. The 
coefficients on  and  are both positive (0.968 and 0.127 𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴 ∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴
respectively) and significant at the 1% level, indicating that executive compensation is 
closely linked with accounting performance. We further include the interaction term 
of  and . CONS ∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴
In Model 4, the coefficient of  is significantly positive. This ∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴 × CONS
finding is consistent with our hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between 
accounting conservatism and executive compensation-performance sensitivity. 
However, the coefficient of  of Model 5 is negative but insignificant and  𝑅𝐸𝑇 ∆𝑅𝐸𝑇
of Model 6 is negative and significant at the 1% level. The findings indicate the 
differences between accounting performance and market performance of China listed 
companies. The coefficient of  is also insignificant. The results shown ∆𝑅𝐸𝑇 × CONS
in Table 5 are consistent with our hypothesis that there is a positive relationship 
between accounting conservatism and executive compensation-performance 
sensitivity, particularly for accounting-based measure of performance. 
[Insert Table 5 here]
4.3 Further Tests
In this section, we address several concerns about correlated variables by extending 
our base model (Model 4 in Table 5) to analyze whether the relation between 
accounting conservatism and executive compensation differs. For brevity, we only 
report the results of the key variables in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Firstly, the implementation of new China GAAP in 2007 was one of the most 
influential accounting reforms in the country. The GAAP relaxes the requirement for 
accounting conservatism. So, we split the data into a pre-reform group and a 
post-reform group to re-examine. The results of Model 2 in Table 6 reveal that the 
interaction between  and  is positive and significant at the 5% ∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴 CONS
level in the post-reform subsample but not before the reform. It reflects the demand 
for accounting conservatism is stronger even the requirement is relaxed after the new 
accounting standards. China 2007 GAAP was closely approaching toward 
international standards. 
Secondly, as the correlation between executive compensation and performance is not 
always synchronous (e.g., Murphy, 2000; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Bennett 
et al., 2017), we split the data into a good-performance group and a bad-performance 
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group to re-examine the relationships. As reported in Model 4 of Table 6, the 
coefficient of  is only significantly positive for the ‘bad ∆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸_𝑅𝑂𝐴 × CONS
group’, suggesting that accounting conservatism offsets the lowering of effectiveness 
of executive compensation contracts when firm performance is declining.
Next, if accounting conservatism is generated from information asymmetry between 
different interested parties, we can predict that when information asymmetry is more 
serious, the demand for conservatism would be greater. We use the ratio of market 
value to book value to capture the degree of information asymmetry as higher ratios 
indicate information asymmetry more serious. We split the sample into two groups 
(i.e., high information asymmetry and low information asymmetry). When the firm’s 
ratio is above the average value in the same year for the industry, we consider it to be 
in the high group, and the low group otherwise. Consistent with this claim, we only 
find a positive and highly significanteffect in the high group (as shown in Model 5 of 
Table 6), suggesting that conservatism plays a larger role when the information 
environment is worse.
Besides, we also consider the special background of capital markets in China. In May 
2004, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange announced the establishment of Small and 
Medium Enterprises board (SMEB) as a transition stage for the Growth Enterprises 
Market (GEM). Compared to Main-Board Market, SMEB and GEM have two major 
characteristics. One is that SMEB and GEM are mainly composed of small and 
medium-sized enterprises with high growth and high risk. The other is that small and 
medium-sized enterprises in China are generally family business and their largest 
shareholder is always both a firm’s chairman and CEO. Overall, firms on the SMEB 
have fewer conflicts between the principal and agent, comparing to firms listed on the 
main boards. We speculate that the demand for conservatism as a mechanism in 
executive contracts is lower for firms listed on the SMEB. We split the data into the 
Mainboard group and the Non-mainboard group (SMEB and GEM). The results of 
Model 7 in Table 6 show that the interaction term is highly significant and positive in 
the Mainboard group while in the Non-mainboard it is positive but not significant. 
Finally, this study also looks at the impact of degree of marketization on accounting 
conservatism. Marketization degree is a balanced result of a series of attributes of 
social, economic, legal, and political system in a country or region. High degree of 
marketization provides the more favorable environment for the contract enforcement, 
reflecting the more obvious effect of conservatism (Xu and Lu, 2008). Relying on a 
set of marketization index provided by Fan et al. (2010), we split the sample into two 
groups (i.e., groups of high degree of marketization versus low degree of 
marketization). Because the statistical year of Fan’s et al (2010) research ended in 
2009, thus the post-2009 index is substituted by the index in 2009. As represented in 
Model 9 of Table 6, the interaction effect is highly significant only in the high group, 
which is expected given that stronger market-oriented environment is likely to 
facilitate the implementation of accounting conservatism as a contracting mechanism.
Page 13 of 27 International Journal of Accounting and Information Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Accounting and Inform
ation M
anagem
ent
4.4 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, we rerun our analyses using alternative proxies for accounting 
conservatism. We use another residual estimation model specified as:
      
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 = 𝛼0 1𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼1∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 ― ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼3 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛼4𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ― 1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
  (8)
Where is net receivables of firm i in year t, and   𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∆ 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 ―  𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 ― 1 .
Other variables are as those in Eq. (1). Following the approach of Zhang (2008), we 
also use non-operating accruals as the substitute variable for accounting conservatism 
to redo our test. The results (un-tabulated) based on these alternative measures are 
largely consistent.
5. Conclusion 
Accounting conservatism is a co troversial topic within academic communities with 
considerable regulatory and practical implications. This study used a sample of data 
consisting of all non-financial firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period between 2002 and 2012 to investigate 
whether and how accounting conservatism impacts the effectiveness of executive 
compensation contracts. Firstly, we find evidence that there is a positive association 
between executive pay and accounting-based measure of performance. More 
importantly, our results reveal that conservatism has a positive relation with the 
executive compensation-performance sensitivity, after controlling for a number of 
firm-specific factors and control variables. To the best of our knowledge, this is one 
of the first attempts at examining the relationship between accounting conservatism 
and executive compensation-performance sensitivity with the data from Chinese listed 
companies. Taken together, our analyses provide evidence to the argument that being 
an efficient governance mechanism, accounting conservatism can help mitigate 
information risk and moral risk for agency problems.
Secondly, we also find that accounting conservatism plays a larger role after the 
implementation of new China GAAP, when the performance is reducing, when the 
information asymmetry is more serious, when the firm is listed on the mainboard, or 
where the degree of marketization is high. The results provide an explanation for 
internal demand for conservatism among China’s listed firms and add evidence on the 
economic consequences of conservatism. Both explanation and evidence help enhance 
our understanding of the benefits of accounting conservatism. 
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Table 1: A Summary of accounting conservatism measurement methods
   Model Literature Traits  
Basu Model Basu (1997) Most common; require higher capital market effectiveness.
Roychowdhury and Watts 
(2007)
Asymmetric timeliness over different 
horizons.Modified Basu 
Model Khan and Watts (2009); Ball 
et al. (2013)
Add some characteristics of firms such 
as size, leverage, market to book value 
ratio.
Net income 
Model Ball and Shivakumar (2006)
Measure the sustainability and reversal 
of accounting income; no need of market 
indicators.
Accruals-cash 
flow Model Ball and Shivakumar (2006) No need of market indicators.
C-score Khan and Watts (2009) A firm-year measure of accounting conservatism.
Accumulated 
accruals Model
Givoly and Hayn (2000); 
Beatty et al. (2008) No need of market indicators.
Residual Model Ball and Shivakumar (2006); Iyengar and Zampelli (2010)
Based on Jones model, no need of 
market indicators.
Earnings 
skewness Model
Ball et al. (2000); Zhang 
(2008) Simple, but much rougher.
Feltham and Ohlson (1995); 
Stober (1996)
Simple, but contains future growth 
option.
Feltham and Ohlson (1995 & 
1996)
Cannot value operating asset and finance 
asset, and some non-accounting 
information is hard to measure.
Book-to-market 
Model
Beaver and Ryan (2000) It distinguishes the variation of book-to-market ratio into bias and lags.
Table 2: Variable measurement
Variables Measurement
Executive compensationCOMP The natural log of the sum of total compensation for the three highest-
paid managers
Dependent 
variables COMP∆ COMPt-COMPt-1
Accounting performance ROA Return on assets, after-tax net income divided by total assetsROA∆ ROAt-ROAt-1
Market performanceRET Stock returns, the buy-hold returns based on monthly returns for a fiscal year
Independent
variables
ΔRET RETt-RETt-1
Financial characteristicsSIZE Firm size, the natural log of total assetsLEV Leverage, total debt divided by total assetsBTM Maturity of development, the book value divided by the market value
Ownership characteristicsNATURE Equals to 1 if the firm is state-owned, and 0 otherwiseFIRST Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder
Control
variables
DMH Equals to 1 if executives hold shares and 0 otherwise
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MH Percentage of shares held by managers, MH=log(1+the number of shares 
held by managers/total shares)SEPAR The separation degree of ownership and control right, see Claessens et al. 
(2000)LP Equals to 1 if the firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 0 if 
the firm is listed on the Shenzhen Stock ExchangeBH Equals to 1 if the firm is issuing B or H shares and 0 otherwise.
Board of directors characteristicsDUAL Equals to 1 if CEO and board chair is the same person, and 0 otherwiseBOARD The number of the board of directorsIBOARD Number of independent directors as a percentage of total board membersAGE The average age of managers GENDER Equals to 1 if the manager is male and 0 if femaleTENURE The years the manager has been on the position, if he/she is hired for the 
first year, TRNURE = 0，and so forthEDU The average educational level of the top three managers, equals to 1 if it is 
equal or less than technical secondary school, equals to 2 if it is junior 
college, equals to 3 if it is undergraduate, equals to 3 if it is postgraduate, 
and equals to 4 if it is a doctoral student (some managers are currently 
registered as a part-time doctoral student) and doctorial graduate.
Region characteristicsCOMPETE Equals to 0 if it belongs to an uncompetitive industry, which contains B03, C08, C42, D01, F01, F09, F31, G40, S, T, P, and Q, and 1 
otherwise. The industry classifications are based on the approach of 
Aharony et al. (2000) and the 2001 standards of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission.LAW Equals to 1 if it is in the industry with higher risk of litigation, which 
includes A and L and 0 otherwise CENT* Equals to 1 if it is registered in central ChinaWEST* Equals to 1 if it is registered in western China EAST* Equals to 1 if it is registered in eastern China (*see Wang and Fan, 2004)
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for COMP and all control variables 
variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Mix Max
COMP 14389 12.415 12.458 0.862 10.168 14.466 
ΔCOMP 13266 0.155 0.099 0.389 -1.023 1.589 
RET1 14387 0.239 -0.039 0.878 -0.600 4.410 
ΔRET1 13328 -0.007 -0.012 1.275 -4.572 4.272 
RET2 14387 0.058 -0.035 0.498 -1.052 2.596 
ΔRET2 13328 0.005 0.016 0.746 -2.887 2.700 
SIZE 14512 21.498 21.366 1.186 18.847 25.144 
LEV 14511 0.487 0.490 0.237 0.047 1.492 
BTM 14512 1.679 1.311 1.080 0.748 7.487 
FIRST 14503 37.867 35.920 15.777 9.090 75.000 
DMH 14512 0.537 1 0.499 0 1
MH 14481 0.025 0 0.079 0 0.423
SEPER 13527 5.485 0 8.058 0 53.424
NATURE 14431 0.600 1 0.490 0 1
LP 14439 0.517 1 0.500 0 1
BH 14474 0.079 0 0.270 0 1
DUAL 14381 0.170 0 0.376 0 1
BOARD 14357 9.265 9 1.945 3 19
IBOARD 14357 0.357 0.333 0.054 0 0.800
AGE 14392 47.262 47.357 3.295 35.846 61.200
GENDER 14403 0.853 0.867 0.103 0 1
TENURE 14403 1.196 1 1.001 0 10.455
EDU 8448 3.352 3.333 0.596 1 5
COMPETE 14512 0.912 1 0.283 0 1
LAW 14512 0.029 0 0.167 0 1
EAST 14512 0.565 1 0.496 0 1
CENT 14512 0.159 0 0.366 0 1
WEST 14512 0.180 0 0.384 0 1
N denotes number of firm/year observations. RET1 and RET2 are stock returns, the buy-hold based on 
monthly returns for a fiscal year. RET 2 is after-market adjustment. Other variables are defined in Table 1. 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%,5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for CONS, TRUE_ROA and ΔTRUE_ROA
CONS TRUE_ROA ΔTRUE_ROAYea
r Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
2003 -0.00033 -0.00296 0.053 0.026 0.028 0.097
2004 0.00016 -0.00170 0.053 0.023 0.028 0.102 -0.004 -0.004 0.121
2005 -0.00031 -0.00313 0.056 0.012 0.023 0.104 -0.013 -0.011 0.113
2006 0.00008 -0.00180 0.057 0.027 0.028 0.099 0.013 0.005 0.109
2007 -0.00031 0.00018 0.065 0.049 0.043 0.107 0.021 0.013 0.122
2008 -0.00033 -0.00321 0.066 0.033 0.029 0.108 -0.016 -0.014 0.121
2009 -0.00014 -0.00125 0.061 0.040 0.034 0.105 0.005 0.003 0.124
2010 0.00001 0.00000 0.061 0.055 0.053 0.098 0.015 0.014 0.116
2011 0.00022 -0.00075 0.060 0.053 0.052 0.093 -0.000 -0.004 0.108
2012 -0.00209 -0.00259 0.053 0.047 0.045 0.083 -0.007 -0.014 0.105
Tota
l -0.00021 -0.00162 0.059 0.038 0.038 0.101 0.002 -0.000 0.117
Note: All variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 5: Results for the impact of accounting conservatism on the effectiveness of executive 
compensation contracts
Accounting performance: TURE_ROA Market performance: RET
Level model Change model Level model Change modelVariables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 3.529 ***（15.22）
3.828***
（16.49）
-0.368**
(-2.19)
-0.236
(-1.4)
3.393***
(14.56)
0.220
(1.59)
PERFOR 0.968 ***（11.18）
1.111***
（12.51）
0.127***
(2.67)
0.179***
(3.64)
-0.010
(-0.59)
-0.020***
(-2.98)
CONS -1.401***（9.44）
-0.587***
(-5.95)
-1.188***
(-8.11)
-0.512***
(-5.91)
PERFOR
×CONS
-1.173
（-1.24）
1.176*
(1.72)
-0.534
(-1.52)
-0.120
(-0.94)
SIZE 0.331***（34.89）
0.314***
（32.35）
0.027***
(4.18)
0.019***
(3.00)
0.337***
(34.87)
0.008
(1.41)
LEV -0.286***（-7.06）
-0.128***
（-2.96）
-0.046*
(-1.73)
0.013
(0.47)
-0.282***
(-6.57)
-0.005
(-0.20)
BTM 0.047***（5.03）
0.035***
（3.71）
0.008
(1.45)
0.004
(0.73)
0.062***
(6.56)
0.002
(0.33)
FISRT -0.004***（-7.90）
-0.005***
（-8.67）
0.001
(1.5)
0.000
(1.2)
-0.005***
(-8.02)
0.001*
(1.85)
DMH 0.036**（2.04）
0.035**
（2.03）
0.000
(-0.01)
0.001
(0.05)
0.039**
(2.24)
0.010
(0.91)
MH 0.637***（5.30）
0.571***
（4.79）
-0.030
(-0.31)
-0.055
(-0.57)
0.612***
(5.07)
0.024
(0.33)
NATURE -0.052**（-2.52）
-0.041**
（-2.00）
-0.011
(-0.80)
-0.007
(-0.5)
-0.040*
(-1.93)
0.006
(0.51)
SEPER 0.003***（2.91）
0.003***
（2.76）
0.000
(0.21)
0.000
(0.08)
0.003***
(3.03)
0.000
(0.31)
LP -0.096***（-5.36）
-0.095***
（-5.36）
0.002
(0.14)
0.003
(0.27)
-0.099***
(-5.53)
0.013
(1.26)
BH 0.122***（4.18）
0.137***
（4.71）
-0.012
(-0.63)
-0.005
(-0.28)
0.135***
(4.57)
-0.009
(-0.52)
DUAL 0.054**（2.44）
0.056**
（2.54）
0.034**
(2.23)
0.034**
(2.22)
0.055**
(2.46)
0.024*
(1.81)
BOARD 0.026***（5.48）
0.024***
（5.12）
-0.005
(-1.57)
-0.005*
(-1.71)
0.024***
(5.13)
0.000
(0.17)
IBOARD 0.282*（1.80）
0.299*
(1.93)
0.016
(0.15)
0.023
(0.22)
0.278*
(1.77)
0.058
(0.62)
AGE 0.009***（3.27）
0.010***
(3.64)
-0.002
(-1.18)
-0.002
(-0.98)
0.010***
(3.43)
-0.006***
(-3.28)
GENDER 0.154*（1.80）
0.135***
（1.59）
0.003
(0.06)
-0.004
(-0.06)
0.099
(1.15)
0.041
(0.81)
TENURE 0.075***（9.15）
0.074***
（9.08）
-0.006
(-1.02)
-0.007
(-1.23)
0.075***
(9.17)
-0.021
(-4.35)
EDU 0.153***（10.86）
0.158**
（11.26）
-0.005
(-0.58)
-0.004
(-0.46)
0.162***
(11.39)
-0.009
(-1.07)
COMPETE 0.209***（5.05）
0.176***
（4.26）
0.026
(0.93)
0.012
(0.42)
0.191***
(4.57)
0.002
(0.07)
LAW -0.177**（-2.49）
-0.162***
(-2.30)
0.026
(0.52)
0.029
(0.59)
-0.165**
(-2.30)
0.062
(1.48)
EAST 0.178 ***（6.49）
0.175***
（6.42）
-0.031
(-1.60)
-0.030
(-1.57)
0.189***
(6.86)
-0.022
(-1.34)
CENT -0.109***（-3.39）
-0.116***
（-3.64）
0.023
(1.03)
0.021
(0.94)
-0.101***
(-3.12)
0.022
(1.12)
WEST -0.120***（-3.75）
-0.123***
（-3.87）
0.021
(0.97)
0.02165
(0.99)
-0.108***
(-3.34)
0.015
(0.79)
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INDUS/YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6747 6747 5214 5214 6733 6653
F 119.75 118.77 3.33 3.96 112.32 4.39
Adj. Rsq. 46.81% 47.58% 2.18% 2.87% 46.23% 2.58%
All variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
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Table 6: Further Tests
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Performance Information asymmetry Listed board MarketizationVariables Pre-reform
(2004-2006)
Post-
reform
(2007-2012) Good Bad High Low
Mainboard Non-mainboard High Low 
Intercept -0.108（-0.31）
-0.135
（0.70）
-0.215
(-0.88)
-0.317
（-1.35）
-0.250
（-0.85）
-0.212
（-0.92）
-0.161
（-0.59）
-0.086
（0.62）
-0.343
(-1.54)
-0.190
（-0.73）
ΔTRUE_ROA 0.239**（2.34）
0.161***
（2.86）
0.159**
(2.07)
-0.032
（-0.43）
0.111
（1.44）
0.226***
（3.47）
0.238***
（2.94）
0.354***
（6.07）
0.170**
（2.55）
0.180**
（2.51）
CONS -0.581***（-2.60）
-0.593***
（-5.35）
-0.466***
(-2.92)
0.478***
(-3.27)
-0.595***
（-3.94）
-0.547***
（-4.00）
-0.557***
（-3.53）
-0.518***
（-4.50）
-0.617***
(-4.29)
-0.581***
(-4.12)
ΔTRUE_ROA
×CONS
-0.444
（-0.28）
1.576**
（2.09）
0.667
(0.62)
1.782*
（1.71）
2.417**
（2.35）
0.436
（0.45）
2.888***
（2.68）
1.056
（1.32）
2.225**
（2.27）
0.464
（0.48）
CONTROLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
INDUS/YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1481 3733 2517 2697 1869 3345 1753 3723 2465 2749
F 1.69 3.50 2.10 2.31 2.51 2.47 2.68 3.01 2.15 2.41
Adj. Rsq. 2.04% 3.18% 2.22% 2.46% 4.03% 2.23% 4.32% 2.48% 2.24% 2.45%
Note: All variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
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